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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE COUNTY, a
body politic and
corporate,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 15755

MURRAY CITY REDEVELOPMENT and MURRAY CITY, a
municipal corporation,
VAUGHN SOFFE, JACK DEMANN
and JACK FIT'~'S,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was brought by Salt Lake County to
contest the validity of the adoption of a redevelopment plan
by Murray City, defendants-respondents, pursuant to the Utah
Neighborhood Development Act, Chapter 19, Utah Code Annotated §11-19-1, et. seq. 1953, as amended 1971, and to
challenge the validity of Murray City Ordinance No. 458
enacted to implement said Utah Neighborhood Development Act
on procedural and constitutional grounds.

The Plaintiffs
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sought to have the Murray City Neighborhood Development Plan
be declared null, void and of no effect.
native,

In the alter-

it was requested that defendants-respondents be

required to redraw the project area to conform with the
requirements of the Utah Neighborhood Development Act.
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT
The trial court ruled in this case on two different
occasions.

Initially, defendants-respondents filed a

motion for summary judgment and were granted a partial
summary judgment for all issues except two:
1.

Whether there was sufficient evidence of "blight"
upon which the Murray Redev2lopment Agency could
base its determination that blight existed in
the project area; and

2.

Whether the boundary areas of the project area
comport with the description given in the plan
and the public notice.
(Transcript at 163)

Plaintiff-appellant filed a Notice Preserving
plaintiff's Right to Appeal in regard to this partial grant
(Transcript 167-168).

The plaintiff-appellant and defendants-

respondents then each filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.
The motion of defendants-respondents was granted without
specified reasons

(Transcript at 258-259).

Summary Judgment

was entered on the 5th day of March, 1978 (Transcript at
270-271).
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Westside Action Committee, a coalition of
property owners in the proposed redevelopment area, acting
as amicus curiae, seeks reversal of the judgment of the
trial court and requests that the Court enter a judgment in
favor of plaintiff-appellant and against defendants-responden
determining that the Murray City Ordinance adopting and
implementing the Neighborhood Development Plan was not
enacted in accordance with Utah Neighborhood Development
Act, Utah Code Annotated §11-19-1, et seq. and is therefore
null, void and of no effect; or alternatively, require the
Murray City Redevelopment Agency to redraw its project area
to be in conformance with the Utah Neighborhood Development
Act, in particular, Sections 11-19-9 and 11-19-2(10).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Murray City Board of Commissioners appointed
the Murray City Redevelopment Agency with three of the
Commissioners serving as the chief policy body of that
agency.
On June l, 1976, a preliminary plan for redevelopment in Murray City was adopted by the Murray City Commission
(Exhibit B) on the basis that said areas were ''blighted"
areas.

This plan appears to be based primarily on a 1976

study, the Murray Core Area Downtown District Revitalization
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Plan which dealt primarily with a small area from 4800 South
to First Avenue (approximately 5050 South) on both sides of
State Street.

The Redevelopment Agency adopted the general

plan and goals on July 1, 1976.

A single notice was published

in the Murray Eagle on July 20, 1976, showing hearing dates
of August 23, 1976 and August 24, 1976 (Exhibit F).
hearing was held until September 6, 1976,
D, Respondent's Brief at page 7).

No

(Minutes Exhibit

On August 27, August 31,

September 2 and September 6, 1976, the City Commission
caused a notice to be published in the Salt Lake Tribune
stating the hearing would be held on September 6, 1976
(Exhibit G).
day period.

These four notices were

s~read

over an eleven

There is nothing in the record to verify

defendants-respondent's statement that notice was sent to
property owners on September 1, 1976 (Brief of Respondent at
pages 7 and 8) and petitioning property owners did not
receive such notice.
On September 8, 1976, although none of the public
was present, the Murray City Commission adopted Ordinance
No. 453 accepting the Redevelopment Plan.
On October 8, 1976, plaintiff-Appellant filed a
Complaint in tbe District Court of Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, attacking the proposed redevelopment on several

-4-
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grounds.

Plaintiff-appellant's complaint raised numerous

objections to the plan in its first cause of action, then in
the second, third, fourth and fifth causes of action raised
constitutional objections to the Utah Neighborhood Development Act as applied factually to Salt Lake County (Transcript 2-12).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED
DEFENDANL'S-RESPONDEN'S BECAUSE THE NEIGHBORHOOD
DEVELOPMENT PLAN'S DETERMINATION OF BLIGHT
WAS NOT STATUTORILY ADEQUATE.
A redevelopment plan may not be enforced which
does not comply with the provisions of the Utah Neighborhood
Development Act, Utah Code Annotated §11-19-1, et seq.
Section 11-19-9 of that act specifically requires that:
A project area must be restricted to
buildings, improvements or land which are
detrimental or inimical to the public
health.
There has been no such restriction in this case.
Two project areas have been outlined and there is nothing on
the record tQ indicate that either has been restricted to
"buildings, improvements or lands which are detrimental or
inimical to the public health".
The areas outlined for this project cannot be
sustained as a blighted area.

Although not all homes in a

project area need meet the standard for blight, certainly

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the majority should.

Respondent's best evidence indicates

that at best 5.31% of the buildings were beyond repair.
(Exhibit #1).

Assuming that the 5.31% figure can be sup-

ported it is, nevertheless, an insufficient basis on which
to declare an area blighted.

Allowing such a precedent to

stand would mean that in any area of 20 homes, if one was
"beyond repair" the entire area could be declared a redevelopment project.

If the 5.31% were not evenly dis-

tributed but were found in a single area, only that small
area should be taken as a project area.
Defendants-Respondents support their action by
contending that blight is a process and must be viewed from
that perspective (Respondents' Brief at 20).

To use such a

pre-determined point of view subverts the requirement of an
objective standard and would sanction a determination of a
process of blight in an area where the homes are in satisfactory condition.

Defendants-respondents could find

occasional disrepair to be the "process of blight".

Such a

standard is no standard at all.
Section 11-19-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, states:
Every project area redevelopment plan shall
be accompanied by a report containing:
(1)
the reasons for the selection of the
project area;
(2)
a description of the physical, social
and economic conditions existing in
the area; ...
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Murray City's failure to treat the two project areas separab
statistically is a violation of this section.

Unless

analyzed separately, there is no reason to believe that any
of the statistics accurately represent the extent of blight.
Combining such area statistics does violence to the legislature requirement that separate plans be made for each
project area.
Utilizing the powers of eminent domain for redevelopment of such minimal need is an abuse of the legislative grant of that power.

Eminent domain is a harsh

exercise of power and strict construction should apply.
This Court recently held that the power of eminent domain is
not to be exercised thoughtlessly or arbitrarily and, further
that such a taking must be founded on public necessity, Salt
Lake County v. Ramoselli, 567 P.2d 182

(Ut. 1977):

The power of eminent domain is not to
be exercised thoughtlessly or arbitrarily
and the courts possess full authority to
determine the proper limits of the power
to prevent abuses in its exercise, and
litigants should, and do have great latitude in conferring, dispositive functions
upon the court as they clearly did in this
instance.
In circumstances similar to this case, the County was seeking
to condemn 11 acres for a park and recreational areas and
this Court held that the County did not establish public
necessity.
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In a similar case the Florida Supreme Court placed
the burden on the condemning authority to establish public
purpose and

rea~onable

necessity and held that the burden

was n0t met.
Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Development Authority,
315 S. 2d 451 (Fla. 1975).

In Baycol, the Fort Lauderdale

Downtown Development Authority sought to condemn property by
eminent domain for construction of a parking facility.
Although the landowner's attack addressed the issue of bonds
and the anticipated private use of the area, the Supreme
Court of Florida addressed generally the power of eminent
domain.

The Court held that "a strict cor1'.otruction must be

given against the agency asserting the power" of iminent
domain,

Id at 455.
The standards fnr declaring an area blighted are

stricter than tnose for condemnation for a public use.
A determination of blight can never be sustained
on grounds of a better use.

It must be shown as a real

hindrance to the city and incapable of elimination or improvement without public assistance, Sweetwater Valley
Civic Assoc. v. National City, 133 Cal. Rptr. 859, 555 P.2d
1099

( 1976).

Blight must be made on determination of the

existing use and not a better use, Id.

The project areas

under consideration in the present case have not been shown
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to be blighted areas and at most meet only the foregoing
concept of optimum use and should not be sustained.
This Court made clear in Ramoselli, supra, that
the court has full power to determine the proper limits of a
grant of legislative power to prevent abuse of exercise.
This Court has the power to examine the evidence to determine if it was exercised arbitrarily or capriciously.

Even

assuming for the sake of argument that the areas may be
found to be "blighted'' under the definition of the Utah
Development Act, the provisions of §11-19-9 of that Act in
its most limited interpretation requires that the condemnatic
be restricted to "buildings, improvements, or land which are
detrimental or inimical to the public health, safety or
welfare," §11-19-9, Utah Code annotated, 1953, as amended.
The deposition of Charles Clay indicates that several nice
homes have been included.

Any residence not found to be

detrimental or inimical to public health should be excluded
from the project area.

The language of the statute clearly

indicates an intent that the taking should be of the selective type suggested by Nichols:
Although acceptance of the "area" concept
seems to preclude the omission of any parcel
within the area, it has been said that where
the taking is for the purpose of preventing
the spread of blight and to conserve the
basic character of a deteriorating area or

-9- by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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develop a new character, inoffensive parcels
may be omitted from the taking or conversely,
offensive parcels only may be taken on the
theory that the remedial action need not
await total deterioration. Vol. 2A,
Nichols on Eminent Domain, §7.51561(1)
Blight pg. 7-221.
Thus the agency should at least be required to make a determination of houses to be omitted.

The case should be

remanded for this purpose.
The Murray City Board of Commissioners have not
shown that the project areas are blighted areas as defined
by §11-19-2(10), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended:
Characterized by the existence of buildings
and structures used or i~tended to be used
for residential, commerc~al, industrial,
or other purposes, or any combination of
such uses, which are unfit or unsafe to
occupy for such purposes or are conducive
to ill health, transmission of disease,
infant mortality, juvenile delinquency,
and crime because of any one of a combination of the following factors:
Instead defendants-respondents have emphasized factors
listed after this paragraph such as the irregular form and
shape of lots [11-19-2(10) (g)] without demonstrating that
the project areas meet the essential requirements set out
above.
Such evidence of blight as the City has presented
is disputed by the petitioning area residents and its superficiality is offensive to people who fear losing life long

-10-
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homes.

The finding that 5.37% of the homes were in less

than rehabili~able condition was made on the basis of a
window survey done by Mr. Watts (Watts deposition at 499).
The studies used were not current and boundaries of the
areas covered not the same as those of the project areas.
The MARC Study, Murray Core J\.rea Downtown Revitalization
Study and Neighborhood Development Plan do not pertain to
the same boundaries.

Such differences may well have signi-

ficant effects.
The City has gone beyond the power granted by the
Neighborhood Redevelopment Act first in applying it to an
area which it cannot show to be blighted and second in
extending project areas beyond buildings and land it claims
to be blighted.

The elderly and low income residents of the

project areas who are petitioning this court should be
protected from the enormous power granted by this act being
used in such a capricious and arbitrary fashion.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS GRANT OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS- RESPOtJDENTS BECAUSE THE
NEIGHBORHOOD DEVELOPMENT PLAN WAS NOT DEVELOPED
IN STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE LEGISLATIVE GRANT
OF AUTHORITY.
A.

The Murray City Commission did not comply with
the requirements of Notice in Section 11-19-16
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.

-11-
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Notice of public hearing - Contents. Notice
of the public hearing on a project area redevelopment plan shall be given by publication
not less than once a week for four successive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
published in the county in which the plan
lies.
Utah Code Annotated §11-19-16.
Although specific requirements are set out in the
statute for adequate notice, the Murray City Commission did
not comply.

Three elements must be satisfied to meet the

requirements of notice in this section:
less than once a week,
weeks and (3)

(2)

(1)

it shall be not

it shall be for four successive

the publication shall be in a newspaper of

general circulation.

It must be inferred that each notice

would give the same date, time, place and other pertinent
information.

To fail to require such would thwart the

intent of noticeto give interested parties an opportunity to
reply.
The first attempt of notice by publication was
made by the Murray City Commission on July 20, 1976, in a
small weekly newspaper called the Murray Eagle.

Publication

there occurred once only and publicized the hearings dates
as August 23, 1976 and August 24, 1976 (Exhibit F).

Clearly

this single publication did not meet the three statutory
elements of sLfficient notice.

The record attests to the

fact that such hearings were never held and so these notices
only served to confuse the situation.
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The only other attempt to give notice by publication commenced on Friday, August 27, 1976, and was followed by notice on Tuesday, August 31, 1976 then Thursday,
September 2, 1976, and final publication on the date of the
hearing, Monday, September 6, 1976.

These notices appear to

be a last minute attempt at compliance but cover only one 11
day period and not the required four weeks.

Such "publi-

cation" is insufficient to give notice of a hearing under
the statute but is more inadequate still in this case
because it also had to correct the previous misleading
notice.
Defendants-respondents asserts
at page 11)

(Brief of Respondent

that the affidavits of publication show publi-

cation on five different dates.

Examination of the affidavit

reveal that the two notices were of different hearing dates.
(Exhibits F 1 & 2).
of giving notice.

Such inconsistency defeats the purpose
These notices are not to be considered as

one act of publication but, rather two very separate acts.
Because they publicized two completely separate hearings, a
proper second notice was still more imperative to correct
the first.
The Florida Supreme Court in Baycol, Inc. v.
Downtown Development Authority, 315 S.

2d 451

(Fla. 1975)

made clear that when an eminent domain action is being

-13-
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cunsidered strict compliance with statutory procedures is
required.

Baycol should apply in this case, for to allow

less than strict construction would be to thwart clear
legislative intent.
The issue of the use of the police power to effect
an urban renewal program through eminent domain is a serious
intrusion of due process rights for the individual.

Because

of the seriousness of such an action, due process rights
must be strictly observed.

Only strict compliance with the

processes mandated by legislative grant will be sufficient
to preserve those rights.
Although the use of the police pofier to affect
zoning is a less significant intrusion into the rights of
the individual, the courts have chosen in such cases to
require strict compliance with the statutory grant of power.
Though a change in zoning will not mandate that a person
leave his home or neighborhood, the courts have still chosen
to carefully preserve the individual's rights.

In Hart v.

Bayless Investment & Trading Co., 346 P.2d 1101 (Arizona
1959) the courts found that:
This Court has held that, where a jurisdictional notice is required to be given
in a certain manner, any means other than
that described is ineffective (citations
omitted) . This is so even though the
intended recipient of that notice does
in fact acquire the knowledge contemplated by the law.

-14-
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. . . This Court has shown a predilection in analogous cases to demand
strict compliance with statutory requirements concerning the zoning aspect of the
police power.
(Id. at 1108 1109).
Lack of statutory notice has been found to be a
jurisdictional defect which renders action by a zoning
authority void, Pima County v. Clapp, 530 P.2d 1119 (Ct.
App. Arizona 1975).

In that case the county appealed from

an order of the Superior Court directing said County to
process a plan for development of a certain tract that the
County had rezoned to prohibit land uses which were proposed
in the plat.

The court required that the County conform to

a mailing of notice "in addition'' to other notice because
mailing was al~o required in the statute.

The court held

that failure to follow the legislative standards rendered
the action invalid.

See Pima at 1122.

Lack of statutory

notice means lack of strict compliance with statutory guidelines for notice required for eminent domain action and so
should have no less serious result than the invalidity of
the action.
It cannot be argued that the Murray City Commission
even substantially complied with the requirements of notice.
The language of the statute is clear and specific and susceptible to precise interpretation.

Requiring that notice

be by publication once a week for four weeks has a valid
basis and is not arbitrary.

No one would be expected to be
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ready to present a case without adequate time to prepare.
Utah Code Annotated §11-19-17, 1953, as amended requires the
objections to a proposed redevelopment to be filed in
writing.

The legislative body is then required to hear and

pass on all objections.
the time required.

Four weeks is a good estimate of

In Re Phillips Estate, 44 P.2d 699

(1935) spelled out clearly the Utah standard for "successive
weeks", to wit:
Successive weeks.
.means successive
weeks commencing with a Sunday after the
first week commencing with a Sunday in
which the first publication appeared.
Supra.
at page 704.
The notice given in this case did not conform to
this requirement.

The city misconstrues the meaning of the

statute in order to assert its compliance.

Two papers

giving different dates for the hearing will not meet the
requirement.

The publication in the Murray Eagle was of a

hearing date which was never held.

There was no retraction

or amendment made in that notice in the Murray Eagle and so
anyone who might have seen the original notice was effectively
denied the purpose for notice.

The statutory requirement of

four publications once per week is especially important in
this case because the erroneous information required correction.
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Defendants-respondents states at page 12 of thei,
brief that "substantial compliance" is the proper standard
for the trial court to apply to the present case and quote;
Beck v. Ransome-Crummy Co., 42 Cal. App. 764, 184 P. 431
(Calif. 1919), to-wit:
If, either in the summons or in the resolt
tion, there is not an entire omission of a
statutory requirement, but merely a defect,
a court may properly determine there has or
has not been a substantial compliance with
the statute dependent upon the facts of the
particular case.
.This judgment of
what is a substantial compliance with the
statute is to be exercised in the first
instance by the trial court.
If the case is
one where a requirement of the statute has
not been entirely disregarded, its [the
trial court's] determination of the questi~
of substantial compliance ought to be controlling in the absence of discretion.
(Id at page 434) (Brief of Defendant at 12)
However, defendants-respondents did not quote thE
complete paragraph.

The preceding sentences state:

Where a clear statutory requirement is
omitted from the initial resolution or
process which is the means of imparting
notice of adverse proceedings, the rule of
liberal construction must yield to the
constitutional guarantee of due process
of law. Courts cannot in a particular
case dispense with any element of notice
which the Legislature has enacted shall
be given in all similar cases.
Beck
supra at page 434) (emphasis added)-:Should there have been any question of the court'
intent it was c 1 ari'f'ied in Fidelity v. Deposit Company of
Maryland v. Claude Fisher Co., 327 P.2d 78 (2nd Dist. Ct.
Appeals Calif., 1958).

Although a contract case, the court
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cited Beck, supra, to support its statement that: "Statutes
of limitation and the like, prescribing definite periods of
time within which actions may be brought or certain steps
taken are, of necessity, adamant rather than flexible in
nature."

(at page 81).
Defendants-respondents did not meet the required

slandard of strict compliance nor did defendants-respondents
act in even substantial compliance adequate to support the
legislative intent.

Therefore, the trial court acted

arbitrarily and capriciously in granting summary judgment to
defendants-respondents.

Inadequate notice is a jurisdictional

defect which should void the action, as stated in Hart supra
at 1108:
In other jurisdictions, courts which have
been confronted with this issue have found,
almost without exception, that compliance
with statutory requirements as to hearing
and notice is jurisdictional and that
ordinances which have not been adopted in
conformity with the enabling act are void.
Hurst v. City of Burlingams, 207 Cal. 134,
277 P. 308; Kelly v. City of Philadelphia,
382 Pa. 459, 115 A.2d 238; Rhode Island
Home Builders v. Budlong Rose Co., 77 R.I.
147, 74 A.2d 237; Treat v. Town Plan &
Zoning Commission, 145 Conn. 136, 139
A.2d 601; Gendron v. Borough of Naugatuck,
supra.
(See also Pima County at 1122.)
Although defendants-respondents seeks to distinguish Hart on the basis of different code requirements
and distinctions in the statute, the language of the Hart
Court was never intended to be strictly on those facts, and
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actually expresses the ideas of strict compliance to whatever the legislative restriction.
By the Zoning Act, certain authority was
conferred upon the Board, but subject to
those express conditions imposed by the
same Act. An attempted exercise of that
authority without compliance with the
statutory conditions precedent is utterly
void and of no effect.
It is true that
where there is no factual evidence presented to show that such an ordinance was
not properly adopted, such an enactment is
entitled to the presumption of regularity
which attaches to all official acts (citations omitted). However, when, as here,
facts are shown which rebut that presumption, the courts will exercise their
jurisdiction to determine whether the
necessary statutory prerequisites have
been complied with. Hart, supra. at 1105
(emphasis added).
~~
Hart would be applicable to the case at hand and
would demand compliance to whatever statutory conditions had
been given.
B.

The Redevelopment Agency has not included in
their report a relocation plan as required
under Section 11-19-14(4), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended in 1971, nor has
the Murray City Commission complied with
Utah Code Annotated §§11-19-21 (5) (g) or
11-19-21 (5) (h) or 11-19-21 (6).

Because of the seriousness of the use of eminent
domain under the police power great protections must be
provided the property owners.

Section 11-19-14(4) Utah Code

Annotated reads in pertinent part:
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Every project area redevelopment plan shall
be accompanied by a report containing:
. (4) A method or plan for the-relocation of families and persons to be
temporarily or permanently displaced from
housing facilities, if any, in the project
area.
The Neighborhood Development Plan contains a perfunctory attempt to meet the requirements, to-wit:
4.
A method or plan for the relocation
of families and persons to be temporarily
or permanently displaced from housing
facilities, if any, in the project area.
During the annual increment from
July 1, 1976 to June 30, 1979, there will
be relocation activities. The Agency shall
comply with the federal Uniform Relocation
Act as adopted in 1971 and amended from
time to time and the State Relocation Act.
We will work to replace the displaced
resident within the area of Murray City
to minimize the social hardship.
(Exhibit
1 of the Neighborhood Development Plan) .
The Utah Neighborhood Development Act is explicit
in its requirements of what must be shown before the plan is
adopted:
11-19-21 Adoption of ordinance - Contents.
--The ordinance shall contain:
... (5)
The findings and determinations
of the legislative body based upon fact
that:
... (g)
The agency has a feasiable
method or plan for the relocation of
families and persons displaced from the
project area, if the redevelopment plan
may result in the temporary or permanent
displacement of any occupants of housing
facilities in the project area, and
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(h)
There are or are being provi~
in the project area or in other areas not
generally less desirable in regard to p~
utilities and public and conunercial facii
and at rents or prices within the financ1
means of the families and persons displac
from the project area, decent, safe and
sanitary dwelling equal in number to the
number of and available to such displaced
families and persons and reasonably acces
to their places of employment; and
(6)
A statement that the legislativ
body is satisfied permanent housing f acil
will be available within three years frorr
the time occupants of the project area ar
displaced and that pending the developmen
such facilities there will be available
to such displaced occupants adequate
temporary housing facilities at rents con
parable to those in the conununity at the
time of their displacement.
The simple statement in the Neighborhood Developmen
Plan that they "shall comply" with the law cannot serve as
a "method or plan" of relocation.

The Federal Uniform

Relocation Act and State Relocation Acts do not set up plans
but provide onJy general and minimal guidelines.

To state

as part of a plan of relocation that these Acts will be
utilized is absurd.

The point of the statute was not to

encourage repetition of generalizations but to require
development and implementation of a detailed plan.
It is readily apparent that no plan has been
formulated.

The June 1, 1976 plan (Exhibit I)

stated that

approximately 1,000 people live within the project area.
The "majority" of those people were said to be between 55
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and 75 years old and limited to two per household.
25 were said to be families with young children.

Only
Finally,

it stated that there was a limited amount of housing available in the area.

The redevelopment agency provides for

relocation only of five families.

If the purpose of re-

location is to protect all displaced persons, it would be
unreasonable to conclude that relocation of five families is
adequate in light of the foregoing statistics.

The remainder

of the 1,000 people are not considered at any point in the
plan. Leaving that number of people unprovided and unaccounted
for is contrary to the intent of the Legislature.
Special care should be taken in this case because
of the predominance of elderly persons in the project area.
Relocation is difficult enough for a young person in the
flux of his life, but may be lifethreatening to an elderly
resident who has established himself in an area.

Established

habits and patterns are important to the elderly.

Many of

these people have neighbors and friends who are now able to
provide company as well as provide an assurance that someone
will be available to help should an accident occur.

Many of

the elderly in the area have the opportunity to live with
family members.

Relocation plans have not made provision to

maintain these extended families.
It is interesting to note that at page 10 of the
Neighborhood Development Plan, the Agency is to begin planning
housing for senior citizens because of the number of elderly
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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who reside there.
need relocating.

Yet it is said only five families will
There is nothing in the record to prove

that any contact has been made with the residents.

No

offers have been shown and no statements have been made in
the Neighborhood Development Plan (Exhibit I)
an awareness of the problem.

that indicate

The record shows that the

agency did not comply with the Utah Neighborhood Developmeru
Act, Utah Code Annotated §11-19-1 et. seq.
The 8th Circuit Court of Appeals in Katsen v.
Coleman, 530 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1976) held that the Missouri
S~ate

Highway Department and chief engineer adequately

complied with the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real
Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 which required thE
state to provide federal agencies with "satisfactory assurm
that adequate redevelopment assistance and replacement
dwellings would be available for displaced persons. In that
case the plan which was held to be "adequate" was far more
extensive than the general statement of this case.
Agency had already:
moved 420 homes,

(3)

(1)

relocated 1,612 persons,

(c)

(2)

relocated four businesses, and (4)

did all relocating in light of a study done by (a)
viewing relocatees,

The

{b)

inter-

spot check of 5% of the housing a~

checking the availability of housing, id. at page 180.
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The Agency actions in this case do not provide
a method or plan for relocation.

That alone is sufficient

basis upon which to overturn the lower court ruling because
it is arbitrary and capricious to rule in favor of an agency
which has not complied strictly with its legislative grant
of power.

Such an omission from the plan is prejudicial to

the substantive rights of the parties here involved.
C.

Murray City and the Redevelopment Agency
have not complied with UCA 11-19-10 and
11-19-12 requiring a separate plan for each
project area.

The Redevelopment Project has been designated two
target areas for redevelopment but the areas are not treated
separately.

UCA 11-19-10 states in pertinent part:

.the agency shall select one or more project
areas comprising all or part of such redevelopment
survey area, and formulate a preliminary plan
for the redevelopment of each project area in
cooperation with the planning commission of the
community.
(Emphasis added)
11-19-12 UCA, states:
The agency shall prepare or cause to be prepared
a redevelopment plan for each project area and
for that purpose shall hold public hearings and
may conduct examinations, investigations and
other negotiations.
These sections require plans for each separate
project area.

The single plan in this instance does not

meet such a standard.

There is but a single set of statis-

tics, street development plans, population densities and
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building intensities generalized for both areas.

The

statistics of the two areas cannot feasibly be the same and
an average is inaccurate.

The areas are six blocks apart

at their closest point and differ greatly in density, land
use and undoubtedly, the instance of "blight".
To treat the areas together thwarts legislative
intent.

The purpose in requiring specifics for each area is

that each will, and should, be separately considered.
Defects or flaws in intended use or, in this case, existence
of blight may void one proposal yet not affect another.
Likewise, statistics may be in excess of 90% in one area for
crime, delinquency, infant mortality, etc. but minimal for
another, yet if the two are combined, the statistics as to
the extent of deterioration will be high enough to cause
alarm.

The only protection against such abuse is strict

compliance with the requirement of separate plans.
There is no plan in the record for Area 2 except
the general plan found in Areas for 1 and 2.

The specific

requirements of the Code cannot be fulfilled in such a
general way.
CONCLUSION
This Court should overrule the lower court's grant
of summary judgment because such grant was arbitrary and
capricious.

The lower court was not supported in a finding
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that defendants-respondents had established a condition of
blight.

The defendants-respondents did not comply with the

statutory mandates for forumulation of a redevelopment plan
and so were without jurisdiction to carry out that plan.

STEVEN ALDER
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Westside Action Corrunittee
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